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Abstract
The Safety Management Annex (Annex 19), which became applicable in November 2013, consolidates safety management provisions
previously contained in six other International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annexes, and will serve as a resource for overarching
state safety management responsibilities. Through Annex 19, ICAO has required that its member states develop and implement safety
management systems (SMS) to improve safety. This mandate includes an approved training organization that is exposed to aviation safety
risks. In 2015, the FAA published AC 120-92B to provide guidance material for certificate holders operating under FAR 121, to
implement and maintain an SMS. This AC may also be used by other aviation service providers interested in voluntarily developing an
SMS based on the requirements in 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 5 (14 CFR Part 5). There are numerous reasons for SMS
implementation going beyond simple compliance with international or national guidelines. The most important of these is safety
enhancement, because it is an intrinsic requirement of the aviation system. There is a vast body of literature regarding SMS, but none of it
suggests a model to a specific service provider. The implementation of an SMS model tailored to FAR 141 approved flight schools has the
strong potential to yield safety enhancement, through a structured management system to control risks in operation. The purpose of this
study is to develop a safety management model for FAR 141 operators, based on the ICAO SMS outlined in Annex 19, and current FAA
requirements and safety protocols, as outlined in AC 120-92B.
Introduction
According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the world economy benefits greatly from the ability of aviation
operations to transport people and cargo worldwide, quickly and safely (FAA, 2015a). The related statistics are impressive.
The aviation industry, both directly and indirectly, supports the employment of 56.6 million people, contributes over
$2 trillion to global gross domestic product (GDP), and carries over 2.5 billion passengers and $5.3 trillion worth of cargo
annually (ICAO, 2013a). Therefore, continuous improvement in aviation safety is paramount to ensuring the aviation
industry will continue to play a major role in driving sustainable, economic, and social development around the world
(ICAO, 2013b; Manuele, 2003).
With the current low accident rate, it is increasingly difficult to make further improvements to the level of safety by using
reactive analysis of past aircraft accidents and the introduction of corrective actions through safety recommendations
(ICAO, 2013b). Thus, a modern safety management approach has been developed that leads to safety risks being addressed
more proactively by regulators and aviation service providers, rather than relying solely on inspection and remedial actions
on end products. This innovation in aviation system safety constitutes a safety management system (SMS), an expression
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indicating that safety efforts are most effective when made
a fully integrated part of the business operation (Ludwig,
Andrews, Veen, & Laqui, 2007; Gnehm, 2013).
A safety management system prompts an operator to
actively identify potential hazards, analyze them, and cre-
ate measures that will minimize the risks involved with
these hazards (DeFusco, Junior, Cooley, & Landry, 2015;
Mendonca, 2008). According to Galotti, Rao, and Maurino
(2006), the systematic approach provides for participation
of all members of the organization in the SMS implementa-
tion. An SMS provides aviation operators the tools to
anticipate and address safety hazards before they contribute
to an accident (Junior et al., 2009). The systemic approach
to managing safety also provides senior-management with
the capacity to deal effectively with near misses and mishaps
so that valuable lessons are applied to enhance efficiency and
safety. The SMS approach reduces the risk of accidents,
improves personnel morale and productivity, may reduce
insurance costs, and is generally good for business.
With the development of Annex 19 – Safety Manage-
ment, updated guidance material, and a dedicated website,
ICAO aims to stress the importance of the overall safety per-
formance in all aspects of air transport operations (Gnehm,
2013). The new Annex on safety management and com-
panion documents, including the Safety Management Man-
ual (Doc 9859), will provide a sound basis for global
aviation safety. The Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP)
midterm objective is that all ICAO states should fully
implement their State Safety Program (SSP) framework by
2022 to facilitate the proactive management of safety risks
(Gnehm, 2013; Graham, 2015; ICAO, 2013a). Each State,
through its SSP and safety legislative framework, will
require that certain service providers, including FAR 141
approved flight schools, develop and implement an SMS.
The SMS should allow for the effective identification of sys-
temic safety hazards and their mitigation (ICAO, 2013c).
The implementation of the SMS model proposed herein
will allow FAR 141 approved school certificate holders to
develop a realistic and efficient balance between safety and
student completions. In addition, it will assure compliance
with national regulations and ICAO Standards and Recom-
mended Practices (SARPs) (FAA, 2015b; ICAO, 2013a;
Junior et al., 2009).
Literature Review
A review of FAR Part 141 approved flight school requi-
rements, as well as the FAA and ICAO SMS provisions
and best practices used to manage aviation safety, was
conducted. This section discusses how an SMS can assist
the training organization’s leadership, management teams,
and employees in making effective and informed safety
decisions, and proposes a systemic model to be used by
these organizations while managing risks in daily opera-
tions (FAA, 2015b).
The Evolution of Aviation Safety
The evolution of safety management in the air transporta-
tion industry can be divided into three eras. During the orga-
nizational era, which began in the 1990s, the management of
safety began to be viewed from a systemic perspective,
encompassing organizational, human, and technical factors.
The concept of the ‘‘organizational accident’’ was intro-
duced, to take into account the impact of the safety culture
and organizational policies on the effectiveness of safety risk
controls. In addition, the reactive approach through the investi-
gation of aircraft accidents and incidents was supplemented
with a new, proactive approach to managing safety (ICAO,
2013b). This safety management approach is based on routine
collection and analysis of safety data using proactive and
reactive methodologies to continuously and effectively iden-
tify and address safety risks (ICAO, 2013c; Maurino, Reason,
Johnston, & Lee, 1995). These enhancements form the
rationale for moving toward a safety management approach
(ICAO, 2013c).
Organizational Accidents
The aviation industry, like other complex technical
fields, is in the age of organizational accidents (Lupoli,
2006; Reason, 1997; Reason, 1998). Preexisting and often
long-standing latent conditions arising in the organizational
and managerial sectors, can combine with local triggering
conditions to penetrate or bypass the aviation system’s mul-
tiple defenses and cause accidents (Maurino et al., 1995).
The organizational accidents theory focuses on events
beyond the failures of front line employees to preexisting
conditions, also known as latent conditions, which result
from improper decisions made by high-level decision-
makers. It is these incorrect decisions that can permit active
failures to occur. Management should build defenses by
creating a culture in which precursor events are detected
and promptly corrected. This approach has the greatest poten-
tial for preventing accidents in an organization (Lupoli, 2006;
Reason, 1998; Wells & Rodrigues, 2003).
To prevent latent conditions from causing accidents, it is
paramount for an organization to develop and maintain a
healthy safety culture (Antonsen, 2009; Cooper, 2000; Lupoli,
2006; Reason, 1998; Wiegmann, Thaden, & Gibbons, 2007).
A healthy safety culture is capable of continuing efforts
toward the goal of maximum safety health, regardless of the
leadership’s personality and current commercial concerns
(Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007). Piers, Montijn, and
Balk (2009) defined safety culture as ‘‘the set of enduring
values and attitudes regarding safety issues, shared by every
member of every level of an organization (p. 5).
A safety culture is composed of four subcomponents: the
just culture, the reporting culture, the informed culture, and
the learning culture (Reason, 1997). Organizations with a
healthy safety culture are characterized by communications
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founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the
importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of
preventive measures. Table 1 (see Appendix) presents the
characteristics of different safety cultures.
Organizational factors are often identified as causal fac-
tors in aircraft accidents. Thus, management should build
defenses by creating a safety culture in which precursor
events, or latent conditions are detected and promptly
corrected (Reason, 1998). This approach has the greatest
potential for preventing accidents in an organization
(Piers et al., 2009; Reason, 1998; Wood, 2003).
System Safety
System safety is ‘‘the application of engineering and
management principles, criteria, and techniques to optimize
safety’’ (FAA, 2010, p. 3.2). System safety techniques are
effective in identifying and especially eliminating hazards,
and in recommending risk reduction methods for mitigating
residual risks (FAA, 2010; Lu, Wetmore, & Przetak, 2006,
Vincoli, 2006). A risk reduction method could be in the for-
mat of a system modification, safety and/or warning devices,
and implementation of new procedures and corresponding
training. The system safety doctrine is effective in accident
prevention and safety enhancement (Lu et al., 2006). The
safety manager could use system safety tools (see Figure 2,
in the Appendix) to identify hazards associated with the ope-
ration of a flight school, and introduce the adequate counter-
measures to mitigate or reduce risks to an acceptable level
(FAA, 2010; Lu, Bos, & Caldwell, 2007; Mendonca, 2008;
Vincoli, 2006).
FAR 141 Approved Flight Schools
Flight training in the United States is conducted under
the auspices of the FAA in accordance with federal regu-
lations laid out in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions (14 CFR) Parts 61, 141, or 142 (FAA, 2016). Flight
schools operating under 14 CFR Part 141 are certificated
by the FAA. Application for certification under Part 141
is voluntary. However, the school must meet stringent stan-
dards to ensure a high level of safety. Moreover, the require-
ments for personnel, aircraft, facilities, and operating rules,
as well as an established curriculum, allow these organiza-
tions to complete certificates and ratings more efficiently
(requiring fewer flight hours).
Several studies have addressed safety issues that could
contribute to aircraft accidents within Part 141 approved
flight schools. A study by Cassens (2010) identified that
students were not being provided opportunities to develop
and apply their aeronautical decision making (ADM) skills.
Even though the FAA mandates that applicants for licenses
should demonstrate good ADM skills (FAA, 1991), flight
instructors were not incorporating instructional methods to
teach the elements of ADM. According to the FAA (2016),
ADM is a systemic approach used by pilots to manage
aviation risks. Cassens (2010) recommended that approved
flight schools introduce processes to periodically determine
the status of ADM instruction and detect any need for
improvement.
Adjekum (2014) conducted an assessment of the pre-
vailing safety culture of a Part 141 approved flight school
for pilots. The study occurred after the implementation of
a phased component of an SMS. The research project
identified significant variances in the perception of the
participants’ safety culture. The researcher identified that
differences in national cultures, flight experience, and years
spent in the flight program can play a significant role in the
safety culture of pilots in a collegiate aviation program.
Adjekum (2014) recommended further studies addressing
the safety culture of Part 141 flight schools. Such research
efforts are vital to establish best practices for creating a
Safety Management System, before FAA mandates the
implementation of an SMS program.
One-third of the midair collisions involving general
aviation (GA) from 2000 through 2012 occurred during
instructional flights (Cassens, 2015). The purpose of
Cassens’ (2015) research was to assess whether behavior-
based safety could effectively motivate Part 141 pilots to
follow FAA recommendations and explicit procedures
designed to prevent midair collisions. According to Cassens
(2015), the organization’s policies created latent conditions
(e.g., pressure to complete a flight lesson at the expense
of clearing turns) that could contribute to midair collisions.
The author provided recommendations to address the train-
ing of pilots as a safety tool to prevent midair collisions.
Additionally, the resarcher recommended that Part 141 flight
schools should frequently review their policies to mitigate
latent conditions.
Adjekum et al. (2015) conducted a study to determine
the relationship between safety culture perceptions and
predicted safety reporting behavior of five collegiate avi-
ation flight programs in the US. The authors identified a
negative relationship between safety reporting behavior and
age. Moreover, the researchers identified operational pres-
sures to complete flight lessons at the expense of safety.
Finally, the investigators found that some pilots demon-
strated a poor safety culture, because they were not confi-
dent that the safety reporting system was anonymous. Pilots
were apprehensive that the information provided through
the system could be used for purposes other than safety
(e.g., administrative purposes). According to Adjekum and
colleagues (2015), a robust safety foundation and frame-
work can positively affect the safety culture of Part 141
flight schools. Most importantly, there is a need for the
implementation of SMS concepts to enhance the safety cul-
ture and consequently improve aviation safety within col-
legiate flight schools.
According to the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
(AOPA) Air Safety Institute (2016), there were 52 fixed
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wing GA aircraft accidents identified as Visual Meteoro-
logical Conditions (VMC) into Instrument Meteorological
Conditions (IMC), from 2001 through 2015. All of them
involved fatalities. Keller (2015) developed two training
protocols to enhance GA pilots’ knowledge, skills, and
abilities to safely manage deteriorating weather conditions.
The target population for the study was composed of non-
instrument rated private pilots, and included Part 141
aviators. Some pilots misperceived the risks involved in
flying into deteriorating weather conditions, while others
over-relied on technology to avoid an accident, and a few
were influenced by their overwhelming desire to arrive at
their destination. Keller recommended enhanced certificate
training to improve novice and expert pilots’ competency to
mitigate the risk of VMC into IMC mishaps.
Safety Management Systems
Freiwald, Anderson, and Baker (2013) conducted a
research project involving a multinational flight training
organization, which had two campuses in the US. The
study was prompted by a series of aircraft accidents and
incidents that resulted in hull losses and four fatalities. At
the time of the study, the organization did not have any
proactive safety strategy (e.g., SMS) implemented, only a
quality assurance program. According to the authors, the
organization had an unhealthy safety culture. For instance,
no participants were familiar with the organization’s safety
reporting system. In addition, top management depended
upon the individuals’ values and fear of being involved in a
mishap, which could ruin their careers, as the best strategy
to prevent accidents. The researchers presented the lack of
safety accountability within the members of the organiza-
tion as the strongest finding of the study. Freiwald and
colleagues (2013) recommended the implementation of an
SMS as the most effective approach to prevent aircraft
accidents in the organization studied.
The Safety Management Annex (Annex 19), represent-
ing the first new ICAO Annex adopted in over thirty years,
consolidated SARPs previously contained in six other
ICAO Annexes, and has served since 2013 as a resource for
ICAO member states’ safety management responsibilities
(Gnehm, 2013). Annex 19 requires ICAO member states to
establish a State Safety Program (SSP) for the regulation
and management of safety (ICAO, 2013c). As a part of its
SSP, each state should require certain service providers
under its authority to implement an SMS (ICAO, 2013c).
This mandate includes training organizations in accordance
with Annex 1 (ICAO, 2011; ICAO, 2013c).
An SMS is an organization-wide comprehensive and
preventive approach to assure the safe operation of an air-
craft through effective management of safety risks (ICAO,
2013c). An SMS provides an FAR 141 operator with the
capacity to anticipate and address safety risks before they
lead to an accident (Chen & Chen, 2014; Junior et. al.,
2009). Additionally, an SMS provides management with
the ability to effectively deal with safety hazards so that
valuable lessons are applied to improve safety and efficiency
(Cardoso, Maurino & Fernandez, 2008a; Liou, Yen, &
Tzeng, 2008). Aviation service providers, including training
organizations, typically implement enterprise-wide manage-
ment systems, such as a quality management system (QMS),
SMS, documentation management system (DMS), and
fatigue risk management system (FRMS). All of those pro-
grams give direction through some type of governance
system. An SMS will integrate the different management
systems as functional components of the overarching orga-
nizational management system, in order to enhance organi-
zational safety and to support the delivery of products and
services (Cardoso, Maurino, & Fernandez, 2008b; ICAO,
2013c). There are various easily identifiable benefits to such
integration, which include: avoidance of redundancy (re-
duce costs); reduction of all-embracing organizational risks
(increase profitability); balance of potentially conflicting
objectives; and elimination of potentially conflicting respon-
sibilities, accountabilities, and relationships. As a result, the
SMS approach reduces losses, improves productivity, and is
generally good for business (Cardoso, Maurino, & Fernandez,
2008a; ICAO, 2013c; Junior et al., 2009).
Federal regulation 14 CFR Part 5 provides a basic set of
processes integral to an effective SMS, but does not specify
particular methods for implementing these processes (FAA,
2015b). Moreover, the requirements of 14 CFR Part 5, in
alignment with Annex 19, were designed to be scalable,
allowing operators of different sizes and complexities to
integrate safety management practices into their unique
business models. Therefore, organizations of different sizes
can meet those requirements in different ways. The SMS
components and related elements do not need to be exten-
sive or complex to be effective. In fact, operators should use
existing safety systems, programs, processes, and resources
to identify, document, and track safety issues to resolution
(DeFusco et al., 2015; Junior et al., 2009; Ludwig et al.,
2007; Volkmer, 2011).
ICAO (2013c) introduced a framework for SMS
implementation by relevant aviation service providers. It
is important to note that the implementation of the
framework should be commensurate with the size of the
organization and the complexity of the products or services
provided. The framework includes four components and
twelve elements, representing the minimum requirements
for SMS implementation. The four components, combined
with the twelve elements that comprise the ICAO SMS
framework, are shown in Table 2 (see Appendix).
The safety policy outlines the principles, processes, and
methods of the organization’s SMS to achieve the desired
safety outcomes (ICAO, 2013b). The policy establishes a
senior management’s commitment to incorporate and conti-
nually improve safety in all aspects of its activities. Safety
accountabilities and responsibilities should be included in
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the SMS safety policy and promulgated throughout the orga-
nization. In addition, the SMS must include a definition
of the levels of management having authority to make deci-
sions regarding safety risk tolerability. The appointment
of a qualified safety manager is key to the effective imple-
mentation and the development and maintenance of an
effective SMS (ICAO, 2013c; Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia,
2010).
Flight schools are subject to an array of emergencies that
warrant actions to save lives and to protect property and
public health (Freiwald et al., 2013; Junior et al., 2009;
Mendonca, 2008). It is unlikely that such organizations will
have sufficient resources to respond to every emergency
situation independently; therefore, it is paramount to be
prepared so that the organization can respond quickly, effi-
ciently, and effectively. The SMS documentation should
include all written documents and materials that contain
information, procedures, and records necessary to conduct
business (Junior et al., 2009; Ludwig et al., 2007). The
SMS documentation facilitates the organization’s internal
administration, communication, and maintenance of the
SMS (ICAO, 2013c). Moreover, it supports continuity and
standardization of organizational processes.
FAR 141 operators should ensure that the safety risks
encountered in aviation activities are controlled, in order to
achieve their safety performance targets (Bastos, 2005;
FAA, 2009; FAA, 2015b; ICAO, 2013c). This process,
known as safety risk management (SRM), includes hazard
identification, safety risk assessment, and the implementa-
tion of appropriate remediation measures (see Figure 3, in
the Appendix). Safety assurance (SA) consists of processes
and activities undertaken by the service provider to deter-
mine whether the SMS is operating according to expecta-
tions and requirements (FAA, 2015b; ICAO, 2013b; Junior
et al., 2009). The service provider should continually moni-
tor its internal processes, as well as its operating environ-
ment to detect changes or deviations that may introduce
emerging safety risks or degrade existing risk controls
(FAA, 2015b). Following the FAA (2015b), an indis-
pensable aspect to positive safety performance is the safety
culture of the organization. The concept of safety culture
underlies the management of safety and is the basis for the
SMS requirements established in 14 CFR Part 5. The safety
promotion component encourages a positive safety culture,
and creates an environment conducive to achievement of
the service provider’s safety objectives. An organizational
safety effort cannot succeed solely by mandate or strict
adherence to policies. Rather, this is achieved through the
combination of technical competence that is continually
enhanced through training and education, effective com-
munications, and information sharing. Junior and collea-
gues (2009) suggested that the four pillars of an effective
SMS contribute to a robust safety culture.
According to ICAO (2013c), the SMS of a training
organization ‘‘shall be commensurate with the size of the
service provider and the complexity of its aviation products
or services’’ (p. 23). The FAA (2015b) adds that an SMS
does not need to be complex or expensive in order to be
effective. If the SMS ensures the active commitment and
involvement of the senior and operational leaders, fosters
the development of a safety culture, helps workers to stay
vigilant in looking for new risks during operations, and
assures that personnel will be supported in decisions made
in the interest of safety, the flight school has an effective
SMS that can lead to reduced material losses and enhanced
productivity (FAA, 2015b; Manuele, 2003).
An SMS will be most effective if it is built upon existing
safety processes and practices. Additionally, it should be
tailored to the organization’s safety culture, complexity,
and operating environment. Before designing the SMS, the
service provider should identify the SMS practices already
in place (gap analysis). According to the U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT) (2015), certificate holders are
likely to already have many of the SMS elements in their
current safety practices and operational processes. Even
though some of those processes and practices may not
entirely fulfill the requirements of Advisory Circular (AC)
120-92B, usually because they may be limited in scope
and interoperability, certain regulatory and voluntary pro-
grams and processes may be appropriate for inclusion in the
organization’s SMS (FAA, 2015b; ICAO, 2013c; Junior
et al., 2009). Table 3 (see Appendix) provides examples
of existing processes and safety programs that could be
integrated in the SMS in order to satisfy the FAA SMS
requirements.
SMS Development and Implementation Costs
Few studies have addressed the costs of developing and
implementing an SMS. The U.S. DOT estimated the costs
of SMS implementation by Part 121 operators to be $224.3
million, from 2014 through 2023 (DOT, 2015). The com-
pliance costs for air carriers with a fleet of nine or less
airplanes will average $164,500 per year. For airlines having
between 10 to 47 airplanes, the costs will average $206,400 a
year. The costs include labor wages and training, expansion
of existing programs, and development of an SMS imple-
mentation plan. However, it is estimated that the economic
benefits of SMS implementation by Part 121 operators will
range from $205 million, through $472.3 million, in the
same period, considering airlines will mitigate the safety
risks identified through the SMS processes. The DOT (2015)
notes that costs can be reduced because most air carriers
already have SMS processes implemented (e.g., operators
maintain training records).
An SMS committee was established in 2016 at the
School of Aviation and Transportation Technology (SATT)
at Purdue University to conduct a study addressing the
establishment of an SMS within the SATT. The SMS com-
mittee identified several SMS processes already implemented
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at Purdue University (e.g., safety reporting systems, and a
safety committee). The SMS committee also identified a need
to involve senior faculty and staff in the SMS processes. The
Purdue SMS committee contacted colleagues at a peer uni-
versity in the US for discussion and guidance relative to their
SMS and flight operations quality assurance (FOQA) imple-
mentation. In sharing their experiences, the peer university’s
leaders noted they received a two-day training grant to learn
about the SMS program and processes, and how to create and
implement an SMS into their organization. They also attended
a two-week training program held by the FAA at the FAA
Training Center to learn the nuances of using an SMS. The
Purdue SMS committee estimated the cost of SMS develop-
ment and implementation to be around $228,000 in the first
year, with continuing annual costs averaging $190,000. The
costs for the first year encompass initial training for faculty
and staff, and the continuing annual costs. The continuing
annual costs include a full-time SMS manager, a full-time
assistant manager, Purdue students’ partial assignments, and
recurrent training and conferences. ICAO adoption of Annex
19 largely consolidated existing safety provisions into a single
Annex. Therefore, the implementation of these SARPs will
result in minimal costs. Most importantly, the transition to
safety management processes will provide safety benefits that
will significantly outweigh any SMS development and
implementation costs (ICAO, 2012).
The Federal Aviation Administration
The ICAO safety management provisions are targeted on
two audience groups, states and service providers. More-
over, they provide the high-level standards states must
implement to fulfill their safety management responsibil-
ities in order to ensure the safe operation of an aircraft
(ICAO, 2013c). The FAA is the agency that regulates and
oversees commercial aviation in the US (Johnson &
Gonzalez, 2013). The agency’s leading concerns are both
the promotion and the regulation of civil aviation, to ensure
safe and orderly growth (Wells & Wensveen, 2004). FAA
AC 120-92B requires certificate holders authorized to con-
duct operations under FAR 121 to develop an SMS that meets
the requirements of 14 CFR Part 5 and is acceptable to the
FAA, by March 2018 (FAA, 2015b; Foxx, 2015). In addition,
this document can also be used by other aviation service
providers interested in voluntarily developing an SMS. The
FAA is considering SMS requirements for Part 139 and
Part 21 operators; however, there is currently no timetable for
that (S. VanBuren, personal communication, September 16,
2016). Additionally, the FAA has established an SMS Vol-
untary Program (SMSVP) for non-121 Certificate Holders,
including Part 141 Pilot Schools (FAA, 2015c). The Agency
can assist FAR 141 approved flight schools during develop-
ment and implementation of an SMS.
The approval of a training organization by a state will be
dependent upon the organization demonstrating compliance
with the relevant requirements in ICAO Annexes 1 and 19
(ICAO, 2013c). FAA (2015b) guidance notes that com-
pliance with AC120-92B will ensure compliance with
the ICAO SMS Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs), in addition to other benefits (see Table 4, in the
Appendix).
Methodology
For this study, the researchers utilized qualitative case
methodology. In a qualitative case study, a particular pro-
gram is studied in-depth for learning more about a document,
a technically distinctive situation, or a suggested resolu-
tion (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005; Yin, 2014). Case studies
are commonly used to help researchers bridge the gap
between foundational studies and practice (Berg, 2001;
Patton, 2015). Additionally, case studies allow research-
ers to build a theory or propose models that expand and
generalize theories and concepts (Yin, 2014). The cases
selected for this research are the ICAO SMS concepts and
framework, and AC120-92B.
An SMS should, at a minimum, develop and maintain a
healthy safety culture, proactively identify safety hazards,
mitigate or eliminate risks through appropriate safety mea-
sures, and provide for constant monitoring and assessment
of the safety level achieved to ensure the organization is
meeting or exceeding its safety objectives (ICAO, 2013b;
FAA, 2015b). This situation opened a door for research, in
terms of designing an SMS model for FAR 141 certificated
flight schools.
In search of a general management method to allow FAR
141 operators to spawn a realistic and efficient balance
between safety and productivity, the authors developed an
SMS model for use by FAR 141 approved flight schools.
The model was developed based upon different views on
safety protocols and the ICAO and FAA SMS concepts.
The internal validity of this study is ensured by the tri-
angulation strategy from multiple sources of data and infor-
mation to support a particular theory (Decrop, 1999; Leedy
& Ormrod, 2005; Patton, 2015). The external validity was
enhanced through the theoretical framework used as the
foundation for the SMS model, for which validity and relia-
bility are recognized. This strong theoretical framework
helped to ensure the external validity of the research project
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). The proposed SMS model (see
Figure 1) may be adapted to the needs and characteristics of
different Part 141 operators. This can be done by establishing
safety objectives that are appropriate for the organization,
integrating other existing management systems, choosing
additional safety risk management strategies that are tailored
to their businesses, or by a combination of these.
This SMS model is appropriate for the size and com-
plexity of the operation of any FAR 141 approved flight
school. The model includes processes to establish respon-
sibilities and accountabilities for safety, identifies safety
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hazards, and assesses the associated risks. This framework
model facilitates development and implementation of safety
risk controls necessary to maintain an acceptable level of
safety, and development and maintenance of a healthy
safety culture. Finally, the model establishes provisions
for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the
appropriateness and effectiveness of safety management
activities (ICAO, 2013c). Most importantly, the propo-
sed framework is in alignment with ICAO SARPs and
AC120-92B requirements.
Discussion
Implementation of an SMS will give an approved flight
school a set of business processes and management tools
to examine the data collected during routine operations.
In addition, it will provide the tools to identify trends that
might eventually lead to mishaps, implement safety risk
controls to mitigate risks, and monitor the program’s eff-
ectiveness (Foxx, 2015, Ludwig et al., 2007). The pillars
of an effective SMS are the essential ingredients to build
and maintain a strong safety culture (Junior et al., 2009;
Mendonca, 2008). Finally, an SMS will assist managers
with their constant challenge of balancing costs, volume of
operations, and safety (Junior et al., 2009).
Safety Policy
The proposed model is composed of twelve subsystems
(see Figure 1) including the four components of an SMS
(ICAO, 2013c). Management commitment to safety is the
backbone of an SMS. The safety policy specifies the
Figure 1. Safety management system (SMS) model for FAR 141 approved flight schools.
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SMS high-level concepts; additionally, it describes the top-
management responsibility, authority, accountability and
expectations for safety. Most importantly, the policy, in
providing the basis for the growth of a healthy safety cul-
ture, ensures that safety is a core value for the organization
(Junior et al., 2009; FAA, 2015b; Stolzer et al., 2010). By
embracing the safety policy, members of the entire orga-
nization will be able to identify and understand that safety
is a priority for senior management and is expected to be a
priority for them as well (Junior et al., 2009). The safety
policy will help identify the accountabilities of all mana-
gers and members of the flight school that, irrespective of
other functions, are responsible for the organization’s safety
performance. The safety policy will also include a definition
of the levels of management with the authority to make
decisions regarding safety risk tolerance (ICAO, 2013c).
The appointment of a qualified safety manager is para-
mount to the effective development, implementation, and
functioning of an SMS (ICAO, 2013c). The safety or SMS
manager is the individual responsible for the development
and maintenance of an effective SMS. The SMS manager
should have access to both senior management and line
personnel, so as to advise them on safety matters and
facilitate hazard identification, safety risk analysis, and
mitigation.
The safety committee is a group of very high-level
aviation professionals, chaired by the accountable execu-
tive. It is composed of senior managers to provide a forum
to discuss safety issues from different perspectives, espe-
cially for hazards requiring a broader viewpoint (Junior et al.,
2009; Mendonca, 2008). Moreover, strategies to eliminate or
mitigate risks must be developed with clearly established
accountabilities. Thus, the safety committee provides the
most effective forum to achieve the objectives of resource
allocation, assignment of responsibilities, and to assess the
effectiveness and efficiency of safety risk control strategies.
Most importantly, when managers realize that their sugges-
tions to mitigate safety hazards are objectively reviewed and
accepted by the safety committee, their participation in the
SMS tends to improve. In the proposed SMS model, the
safety committee roles may include: making safety recom-
mendations, reviewing safety audits and reports for the adeq-
uacy of corrective risk assessments and controls, evaluating
cost-benefit analysis of safety recommendations, and provid-
ing high-level expertise in the risk management process,
including the development and implementation of safety risk
controls (ICAO, 2013c). How an approved flight school
fares if faced with an aircraft accident or serious incident will
depend upon how well it handles the first few hours fol-
lowing the occurrence. An emergency response plan (ERP)
provides the basis for a systematic approach to managing the
organization’s affairs in the aftermath of a significant un-
planned event—in the worst case, a major accident. Aircraft
accidents are rare events; therefore, it is paramount to be
prepared, should one occur (ICAO, 2013c).
The ERP could also address situations such as a major
power outage, loss of radar and/or communications, or other
issues that may compromise aviation safety. An emergency
response plan (ERP) outlines in writing what should be done
during an aviation crisis and who is responsible for each
action. Successful response to an emergency, which reflects
an effective SMS, begins with effective planning (FAA,
2015b; ICAO, 2013c; Ludwig et al., 2007).
Safety Risk Management
Most activities performed by a flight school involve a
certain level of risk (Cassens, 2010, 2015; Adjekum, 2014;
Adjekum et al., 2015; Keller, 2015; FAA, 2009). Thus,
managers must make decisions on risk acceptability,
otherwise they will simply push the decision down toward
the front-line operation, usually the pilots or flight instruc-
tors, who will face the risk and will have no alternative but to
make decisions without the desired assessment (Lupoli,
2006; Mendonca, 2008). The objective of the risk manage-
ment process is to focus safety efforts on hazards posing the
greatest risks (Lu et al., 2006). Hazard identification is a vital
step in this process because risk assessment cannot deal with
concealed risks. Therefore, an approved flight school should
develop and maintain formal processes to ensure that hazards
in operations are identified (Bastos, 2005). Following ICAO
(2013c), the identification of hazards should be based upon a
combination of reactive, proactive, and predictive methods of
safety data collection (see Figure 1). A safety culture in which
all of the organization’s people are motivated and persuaded
to report hazards will provide the data necessary for the SMS
to be effective (Reason, 1997, 1998; Volkmer, 2011).
A characteristic of aircraft accidents is that their severity
is difficult to anticipate (Bastos, 2005; Wood & Sweginnis,
2006). Risk analysis techniques are broadly grouped into
qualitative and quantitative categories. Quantitative tech-
niques are usually applied first. However, few hazards in
aviation lend themselves to an analysis based only on
mathematical and/or computational methods. Typically, the
risk management process is supplemented through critical
and logical analysis of known facts and how they may
interact with each other (ICAO, 2013c; Junior et al., 2009;
Vincoli, 2006). The design of a risk matrix by the flight
school should consider the characteristics of the organiza-
tion, including its safety culture, the specifics of its opera-
tion, and the applicable safety standards. In addition, it
should define what acceptable and unacceptable risks are in
order to categorize the levels of probability and severity.
Many versions of risk matrices are available from the safety
literature and could be used while the flight school is devel-
oping its own risk matrix (Bastos, 2005; Mendonca, 2008).
After the risk assessment phase, all relevant information
should be immediately promulgated within the system, and
most likely will impact the safety promotion component of
the SMS (see Figure 3, in the Appendix, and Figure 1).
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According to Lu and colleagues (2007), the system safety
tool phase processes the information from the previous risk
assessment stage, and recommends the development and
implementation of safety risk controls to mitigate hazards
(see Figure 2, in the Appendix). The FAA (2010) adds
that system safety is a specialty within system engineer-
ing that supports the management of risks in aviation. The
fault tree analysis (FTA), for example, is a system safety tool
that can be used to assist in preventing accidents involving
extremely complex or detailed systems, such as FAR 141
approved flight schools (see Figure 2, in the Appendix). The
FTA may be used to evaluate safety risk controls necessary
to result in a desired event, such as ‘‘no accident’’ (Vincoli,
2006). The implementation of system safety tools will allow
Part 141 organizations to shift from their basic ways of
addressing safety to a more detailed approach for identifying
and prioritizing hazardous precedents upstream.
Investigation of Safety Occurrences
The aircraft accident investigation process must be
conducted only for the purpose of prevention of future
accidents. The focus of the process should be directed
toward effective risk control (ICAO, 2016). According to
Wells and Rodrigues (2003), the purpose of the accident
investigation process is to uncover pervasive unrecognized
causal factors of aircraft accidents and to recommend risk
management measures. This will help prevent similar
mishaps from occurring in the future. However, most safety
occurrences, such as incidents caused by wildlife strikes, do
not warrant investigations by either states or regulatory agen-
cies, and perhaps even the organization. However, such
incidents may reveal serious hazards and/or latent conditions
that will not be disclosed unless the occurrence is adequately
investigated (Cleary & Dolbeer, 2005; Mendonca, 2008). The
investigation of safety occurrences contributes to the conti-
nuous improvement of the SMS by identifying the underlying
causes of the events and implementing appropriate corrective
actions (FAA, 2015a; ICAO, 2013c; Lu et. al., 2007). Safety
investigations can support decisions regarding the develop-
ment of corrective actions and the corresponding allocation of
resources. Moreover, such investigations may identify nece-
ssary improvements to the flight school SMS (ICAO, 2013c).
Safety Training, Education, and Communication
Safety promotion provides a means of encouraging a
positive safety culture. Additionally, it helps personnel
understand and apply the SMS principles, the safety cul-
ture concepts, and procedures and practices that create an
environment conducive to the achievement of the organiza-
tion’s safety objectives (ICAO, 2013c; Junior et al., 2009).
Safety promotion also helps the organization’s profes-
sionals to understand their roles, responsibilities, and acc-
ountabilities within the SMS framework (Volkmer, 2011).
The proposed SMS framework requires that the flight
school implement processes that formalize information
sharing across all levels of the organization to ensure per-
sonnel are fully aware of the SMS. Those processes will
also convey safety-critical information, and explain why
particular safety risk controls and procedures are introduced
or changed.
A flight school safety effort will not succeed solely by
mandate or strict adherence to standard operating proce-
dures (SOPs), processes, and policies (ICAO, 2013c).
Rather, this is achieved through the combination of tech-
nical competence that is continually enhanced through
training and education, effective communications, and infor-
mation sharing. Training is the foundation of any business
plan, and safety training is no exception. Excellence in
activities developed by flight schools requires technical and
mental skills; both are acquired and maintained through
training and practice. In order for the SMS to succeed, trai-
ning should be an ongoing, recurring activity, not just a one-
time process (Junior et al., 2009; Mendonca, 2016). The
success of the proposed SMS model depends strongly on
the organization’s safety culture, which in turn depends on
the efficacy of the SMS training program.
Performance of the Model
The absence of accidents and incidents in an approved
flight school does not necessarily indicate a safe operation
(Adjekum, 2014; Adjekum et al., 2015; Cassens, 2010,
2015; Keller, 2015). In addition, the level of safety within
such a dynamic type of operation is unlikely to be static.
According to Junior and colleagues (2009), one essential
concept addressed by SMS is continuous improvement.
The elements grouped under the safety assurance pillar of
the proposed SMS model provide the tools to accomplish
that. In addition, this pillar aims to ensure that the processes
and safety risk controls taken to enhance safety are effective
(DeFusco et al., 2015; FAA, 2015b; ICAO, 2013c). As noted
by Stolzer and colleagues (2010), the SA and the SRM
processes in the model should be integrated for the SMS to
be effective (see Figure 4, in the Appendix). Moreover, the
complementary relationship between the quality assurance
and safety assurance will facilitate the integration of several
supporting existing processes. Such integration will serve to
achieve synergies to assure that the flight school’s quality,
safety, and commercial objectives are met (ICAO, 2013c).
Implementation of the SMS Model
The proposed SMS model, in accordance with AC120-
92B, requires that the flight school develop and maintain
SMS documentation that describes the certificate holder’s
safety policy and SMS processes and procedures (FAA,
2015b). The suggested disciplined approach to documen-
tation and information management will provide the
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authoritative basis for the SMS, clarify the relationship of
safety management to the other functions of the organiza-
tion, establish the manner in which safety management
activities harmonize with these other functions, and specify
how the SMS activities relate to the company’s safety
policy. The SMS documentation will be made up of the
organization’s SMS manual and the specific procedures for
the SMS processes. The proposed SMS model manual
could be a standalone document, and if the details of the
organization’s SMS processes are already addressed in the
existing documents, appropriate cross-referencing to such
documents suffices (ICAO, 2013c). Finally, the informa-
tion, records, and processes taken to fulfill the objectives of
the SMS may be necessary in the event of a formal safety
investigation or audit by the FAA; therefore, these data
should be maintained in sufficient detail to ensure trace-
ability of all safety-related decisions.
As an ICAO member state, the United States should, as a
part of its SSP, require certain service providers under its
authority to implement an SMS, or notify ICAO of any
differences between their national regulations and practices
and the SARPs contained in Annex 19 (ICAO, 2011;
ICAO, 2013c). AC120-92B requires certificate holders
operating under FAR 121 to implement and maintain an
SMS by 2018. The same document could also be used by
other aviation service providers interested in voluntarily
developing an SMS based on the requirements in Part 5
(FAA, 2015b). It can be anticipated, considering the
benefits of an SMS for aviation safety, and also to comply
with Annex 19 SARPs, that the FAA will (in time) also
require other service providers to implement an SMS,
including FAR 141 approved flight schools.
The CFR Part 141 requirements help to ensure a high
level of safety during the operations of certificated flight
schools. However, several studies have identified safety
issues that could contribute to aircraft accidents (Adjekum,
2014; Adjekum et al., 2015; Cassens, 2010, 2015; Keller,
2015). Recommendations by these researchers to enhance
safety most likely involve at least one of the four SMS pillars.
Cassens (2010) suggested that Part 141 operators should
introduce processes to periodically determine the status of
ADM instruction and whether there is a need for improve-
ment. Those refer to the safety training and education, and the
safety assurance processes of the proposed model.
Studies by Adjekum (2014) and Adjekum and colleagues
(2015) addressed safety culture and SMS tenets. Both
studies identified factors that could have a significant
negative effect on the safety culture of pilots in collegiate
aviation programs. A robust safety culture is paramount for
accident prevention (Junior et al., 2009; Piers et al., 2009;
Reason, 1998). The proposed SMS model, in agreement
with Piers and colleagues (2009), Junior and colleagues
(2009), and ICAO (2013c), will foster the development and
maintenance of a healthy safety culture among Part 141
operators.
Keller’s (2015) study sought to evaluate the effective-
ness of two weather training protocols designed to enhance
GA pilots’ knowledge and abilities when encountering
VMC to IMC conditions. As previously noted, such condi-
tions have contributed to a high rate of fatal aircraft accidents.
Participants of this study included Part 141 pilots. Some of
them misperceived the increased risks due to degrading
visibility while transitioning from VMC to IMC. Others over-
relied on technology to keep them safe. Moreover, the desire
to get to their final destinations played a role in the decision
making processes of a few participants. Those safety hazards
can increase the risk of fatal aircraft accidents. The researcher
recommended enhanced safety training to mitigate such
hazards. The safety training and education components of
the proposed model will provide pilots the skills and
knowledge to fly safely. In addition, they will enhance the
safety culture of the organization.
The SMS development, implementation, and mainte-
nance costs by Part 141 operators will depend on several
factors, among them:
1. The size and complexity of the organization;
2. The existence of already mature SMS processes (e.g.
safety reporting systems; ERP); and
3. The need to hire and/or provide training to SMS
professionals.
However, it is estimated that the safety benefits will
greatly outweigh the costs of developing and implement-
ing an SMS. The implementation of an SMS by a Part 141
operator will help ensure that their safety efforts target the areas
where safety benefits will be greatest, and therefore more
effective. Additionally, it will help promote a sound safety
culture within the organization. Compliance with regulations is
paramount for aviation safety, but the contemporary thinking is
that much more is required to prevent accidents. Organizations
that simply comply with minimum standards set by regulatory
agencies are not in a good position to proactively identify and
mitigate safety hazards, and especially to maintain a sound
safety culture (ICAO, 2013c; Mendonca, 2008). However,
regulatory compliance is critical to employment orientation,
initial and recurrent safety training, routine safety education,
and safety-related event investigations (Lu et. al., 2007).
One benefit of an SMS, as cited by Cardoso and col-
leagues (2008a); the FAA (2015a); ICAO (2013b); and
Ludwig and colleagues (2007) is to ensure compliance
with, and wherever possible, exceed the legislative and
regulatory requirements and standards (see Table 4, in the
Appendix). Therefore, the proposed model will help the
approved flight school to comply with national regulations
and international standards.
Conclusions
International aviation organizations, safety specialists,
and regulatory authorities have established that SMS
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represents the future of the management of safety for the
aviation industry (Volkmer, 2011; Walala, 2015). SMS
concepts have been applied in many countries and are
gaining acceptance in the US as a standard. In order to
comply with ICAO SARPs, the US should, as part of their
SSP, require that FAR 141 approved flight schools, among
other service providers, develop and implement an SMS.
The SMS should, at a minimum, identify and mitigate
safety hazards; ensure that safety risk controls necessary to
maintain an acceptable level of safety are implemented; and
make continuous improvement to the overall level of safety
(ICAO, 2013b; ICAO, 2013c). The ICAO Global Aviation
Safety Plan establishes the global aviation safety objec-
tives, including the specific priorities and milestones to be
addressed by ICAO member states (ICAO, 2013a). The
United States should have a fully implemented and mature
SSP by 2022. Therefore, Part 141 operators (ICAO, 2013c)
will most likely be required to have an SMS by the same
date. As previously mentioned, the SSP provisions in
ICAO Annex 19 require the implementation of SMS by
some aviation organizations under the responsibility of
each ICAO member state. Even though there is a sig-
nificant body of literature and regulations addressing the
concepts of SMS, none really provides a model that could
be used to manage safety risks in approved flight schools.
There are at least four major reasons why the implementa-
tion of the proposed model by approved flight schools goes
beyond regulatory compliance. To begin with, safety is an
intrinsic component of the aviation system. This scheme
becomes of key importance if one considers that interna-
tional air traffic has doubled in size every 15 years since
1977, and that between 2013 and 2030 it is expected to
double again (ICAO, 2014). The 3.5 billion airline
passengers carried in 2015 are expected to triple by 2040
(ICAO, 2015). In addition, the number of aircraft move-
ments is expected to rise to almost 95 million in 2040.
According to the FAA (2014), the number of passengers
carried annually by U.S. FAR 121 carriers is slated to grow
2.2 percent per year until 2034, and the U.S. aviation
system capacity is projected to increase an average of 2.7
percent per year during the same period. This projected
growth in both the international and U.S. aviation systems
will certainly increase the amount of flight training per-
formed by approved flight schools. Secondly, SMS is also
very attractive because of its resulting economic advantages
in preventing mishaps. For example, a research study deve-
loped by Landry and Ingolia (2011) showed that ground
accidents are extremely costly to the aviation industry.
Furthermore, such accidents are estimated to account for an
astonishing $10 billion a year, with only a fraction of those
costs covered by insurance. Another study conducted by
the Flight Safety Foundation (2007) puts a cost of $1
billion per year due to this type of occurrence with cor-
porate aircraft operators worldwide. The implementation of
an effective SMS by airport operators in South America led
to a 21% reduction in this type of occurrence in eight
months (Cardoso et al., 2008a). The third reason is that this
model may be an excellent tool to develop and maintain
a robust safety culture that raises safety awareness, and
results in a reduction of accidents, injuries, and related costs
(Stolzer et al., 2010). Fourth, the proposed model combines
the ICAO and FAA requirements, and considers existing
safety programs and processes that may be integrated into the
flight school SMS. That will assure compliance with national
and international standards while facilitating the develop-
ment and implementation of an SMS by approved flight
schools.
Finally, from a purely business point of view, there is no
reason to wait to improve efficiency and effectiveness, and
to reduce safety risks. Implementing the proposed SMS model
has a cost, but it is infinitely smaller than the costs asso-
ciated with aircraft accidents and incidents. Improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of the organization will lead to
increased profits by approved flight schools. Further bene-
fits will include the potential for reduced insurance costs;
research opportunities for faculty and students; opportunities
for faculty, staff, and students to gain SMS experience; and
an enhanced recruiting tool for parents and prospective stu-
dents. Most importantly, as previously noted, is the potential
for SMS to enhance aviation safety.
References
Adjekum, D. K. (2014). Safety culture perceptions in a collegiate aviation
program: A systematic assessment. Journal of Aviation Technology
and Engineering, 3(2), 44–56.
Adjekum, D. K., Keller, J., Walala, M., Young John, P., Christensen, C.,
DeMik, R. J., & Northam, G. J. (2015). Cross-sectional assessment
of safety culture perceptions and safety behavior in collegiate avia-
tion programs in the United States. International Journal of Aviation,
Aeronautics, and Aerospace, 2(4), 1–34. https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.
2015.1074
Air Safety Institute. (2016). Accident analysis: Accident database.
Retrieved from https://www.aopa.org/asf/ntsb/search_ntsb.cfm
Antonsen, S. (2009). Safety culture assessment: A mission impossible?
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 17(4), 242–254.
Bastos, L. C. M. (2005). Risk management model for on-demand Part 135
(air taxi) operators (Unpublished master’s thesis). University of Cen-
tral Missouri, Warrensburg, MO.
Berg, B. L. (2001). Qualitative research methods for the social sciences
(4th Ed.). Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Cardoso, S. H., Maurino, D., & Fernandez, J. (2008a, May). Lessons
learnt from airport SMS implementation in South America. Presented
at the 10th International Conference on Applications of Advanced
Technologies in Transportation (AATT), Athens, Greece.
Cardoso, S. H., Maurino, D., & Fernandez, J. (2008b, January). Metho-
dology to Estimate Individual and Overall Performance Indicators for
Airport Safety Management Systems (SMS). Paper presented at the 87th
Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting, Washington, DC.
Cassens, R. E. (2010). Elements related to teaching pilots aeronautical
decision making. (Unpublished master’s thesis). Purdue University,
West Lafayette, IN.
Cassens, R. E. (2015). The effectiveness of behavior-based safety in the
flight training environment (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Purdue
University, West Lafayette, IN.
F. A. C. Mendonca & T. Q. Carney / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering 43
Chen, C. F., & Chen, S. C. (2014). Measuring the effects of safety
management system practices, morality leadership and self-efficacy on
pilots’ safety behaviors: Safety motivation as a mediator. Journal of
Safety Science, 62, 376–385. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2013.09.013
Choudhry, R. M., Fang, D., & Mohamed, S. (2007). The nature of safety
culture: A survey of the state-of-the-art. Journal of Safety Science, 45,
993–1012. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2006.09.003
Cleary, E. C., & Dolbeer, R. A. (2005). Wildlife hazard management at
airports: A manual for airport personnel. Retrieved from http://about/
airports/airport_safety/wildlife/resources/media/2005_faa_manual_
complete.pdf
Cooper, M. D. (2000). Towards a model of safety culture. Safety Science,
36(2), 111–136.
Decrop, A. (1999). Triangulation in qualitative tourism research. Tourism
Management, 20(1), 157–161.
DeFusco, R. P., Junior, E. T. U., Cooley, T. R., & Landry, J. M. (2015).
Applying an SMS approach to wildlife hazard management (ACRP
Report No. 145). Retrieved from the Transportation Research Board on
the National Academies website: http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/
acrp/acrp_rpt_145.pdf
Department of Transportation (DOT). (2015). Safety management systems
for domestic, flag, and supplemental operations certificate holders.
Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-01-08/pdf/
2015-00143.pdf
Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter H,
Part 141. (2015). Available online at http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-
idx?tpl5/ecfrbrowse/Title14/14cfr141_main_02.tpl
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (1991). Aeronautical decision
making (Advisory Circular 60-22B). Retrieved from http://about/
documentLibrary/media/ Advisory_Circular/AC_60-22.pdf
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2009). Risk management
handbook (FAA-H-8083-2). Retrieved from https://about/regu
lations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/media/FAA-H-
8083-2.pdf
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2010). System safety handbook.
Retrieved from http://about/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/
aviation/risk_management/ss_handbook/
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2014). FAA aerospace forecast:
Fiscal years 2014–2034. Retrieved from https://about/data_research/
aviation/aerospace_forecasts/media/2014_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.
pdf
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2015a). Aviation emissions,
impact & mitigation: A primer. Retrieved from http://about/
regulations_policies/policy_guidance/envir_policy/media/primer_
jan2015.pdf
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2015b). Safety management
systems for aviation service providers (Advisory Circular 120-92B).
Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_
circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/1026670
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2015c). Safety management
system: Voluntary implementation of SMS for Non-Part 121 operators,
MROs, and training organizations. Retrieved from http://about/
initiatives/sms/specifics_by_aviation_industry_type/air_operators/
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2016). Pilot’s handbook of
aeronautical knowledge. Retrieved from https://about/regulations_
policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/phak/
Flight Safety Foundation. (2007, May). Defusing the ramp. AeroSafety-
World, 2(5). Retrieved April 15, 2016, from http://flightsafety.org/asw/
may07/asw_may07_p20-24.pdf
Foxx, A. (2015, February). Safety News: SMS by 2018. AeroSafetyWorld,
10(1). Retrieved from http://flightsafety.org/aerosafety-world-february-
2015
Freiwald, D., Anderson, C. L., & Baker, E. (2013). Assessing safety
culture within a flight training organization. Journal of Aviation/Aero-
space Education and Research, 22(2), 41–57.
Galotti, V., Rao A., & Maurino, D. (2006). ICAO initiative promotes
global approach to SMS implementation. ICAO Journal, 61(6), 6–8.
Retrieved from http://www.icao.int/publications/journalsreports/2006/
6106_en.pdf
Gnehm, E. (2013). Annex 19: A key amendment to the convention. ICAO
Journal, 68(05), 60–63. Retrieved from http://www.icao.int/publica
tions/journalsreports/2013/6805_en.pdf
Graham, N. (2015). High-level safety event takes urgent action while
respecting strategic goals. ICAO Journal, 70(1), 6–8. Retrieved from
http://www.icao.int/publications/journalsreports/2015/7001_en.pdf
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (2005). ICAO accident
prevention programme (2nd ed.). Montreal, Canada: Author.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (2011). Annex 1 to
the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Personnel Licensing
(11th ed.). Montreal, Canada: Author.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (2012). Safety manage-
ment implementation: Preliminary review of proposed new Annex on
safety management responsibilities and processes (AN-WP/8633).
Montreal, Canada: Author.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (2013a). Global avia-
tion safety plan 2014–2016. Montreal, Canada: Author.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (2013b). ICAO safety
management manual (3rd ed.). Montreal, Canada: Author.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (2013c). Annex 19 to
the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Safety Management
(1st ed.). Montreal, Canada: Author.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (2014). Annual report
of the ICAO Council–2014: The world of air transport in 2014.
Retrieved from http://www.icao.int/annual-report-2014/Pages/the-
world-of-air-transport-in-2014.aspx
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (2015). Annual report
of the ICAO Council–2015: The world of air transport in 2015.
Retrieved from http://www.icao.int/annual-report-2015/Pages/the-
world-of-air-transport-in-2015.aspx
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). (2016). Annex 13 to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Aircraft Accident and
Incident Investigation (11th ed.). Montreal, Canada: Author.
Johnson, M., & Gonzalez, A. (2013). Estimating cost saving for aviation
fuel and CO2 emission reduction strategies. Collegiate Aviation Review,
31(2), 79–102
Junior, M. A., Shirazi, H., Cardoso, S., Brown, J., Speir, R., Seleznev,
O., ... McCall, E. (2009). Safety management systems for airports
(ACRP Report No. 01, volume 2). Retrieved from the Transportation
Research Board on the National Academies website: http://www.trb.
org/main/blurbs/162491.aspx
Keller, J. (2015). Unexpected transition from VFR to IMC: An exami-
nation of training protocols to mitigate pilot gaps in knowledge
and performance (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Purdue Uni-
versity, West Lafayette, IN.
Landry, J., & Ingolia, S. (2011). Ramp safety practices: A synthesis of
airport practice (ACRP Synthesis No. 29). Retrieved from the
Transportation Research Board on the National Academies website:
http://www.trb.org/main/blurbs/166314.aspx
Leedy, P. D., & Ormrod, J. L. (2005). Practical research: Planning and
design. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education.
Liou, J. J. H., Yen, L., & Tzeng, G. H. (2008). Building an effective safety
management system for airlines. Journal of Air Transport Mana-
gement, 14, 20–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. ssci.2013.09.013
Lu, C-t., Bos, P., & Caldwell, W. (2007). System safety application: Con-
structing a comprehensive aviation system safety management model
(ASSMM). International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies, 7(1),
28–45.
Lu, C-t., Wetmore, M., & Przetak, R. (2006). Another approach to enhance
airline safety: Using management safety tools. Journal of Air Trans-
portation, 11(2), 113–139.
44 F. A. C. Mendonca & T. Q. Carney / Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering
Ludwig, D. A., Andrews, C. R., Veen, N. R. J., & Laqui, C. (2007). Safety
management systems for airports (ACRP Report No. 01, volume 1).
Retrieved from the Transportation Research Board on the National
Academies website: http://www.trb.org/Main/Blurbs/159030.aspx
Lupoli, L. C. (2006). Discovering the Brazilian Air Force Squadron Com-
mander’s perceptions regarding organizational accidents (Unpublished
master’s thesis). University of Central Missouri, Warrensburg, MO.
Manuele, F. A. (2003). On the practice of safety (3rd Ed.). New York:
International Thomson Publishing Company.
Maurino, D. E., Reason, J., Johnston, N., & Lee, R. B. (1995). Beyond
aviation human factors. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2008). SMS for bird hazard: Assessing airlines
pilots’ perceptions (Unpublished master’s thesis). University of Central
Missouri, Warrensburg, MO.
Mendonca, F. A. C. (2016). Exploiting science: Enhancing pilots’ safety
training to reduce the risk of bird strikes. Paper presented at the 2016
Bird Strike Committee USA Meeting, Chicago, IL. Presentation retrie-
ved from http://www.aaae.org/aaae/AAAEDocs/Meetings/2016/08/
160807/Pres/26_Mendonca.pdf
Patton, M. Q. (2015). Qualitative research & evaluation methods. London:
SAGE.
Piers, M., Montijn, C., & Balk, A. (2009). Safety culture framework for the
ECAST SMS-WG. Report of the ECAST safety management system and
safety culture working group (SMS-WG). Retrieved from http://www.
atcvantage.com/docs/culture_NLR_SafetyCultureFramework_WP1-
ECASTSMSWG-1.pdf
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Aldershot,
UK: Ashgate.
Reason, J. (1998). Achieving a safe culture: Theory and practice. Journal
of Work and Stress, 12(3), 293–306. https://doi.org/10.1080/0267837
9808256868
Stolzer, A. J., Halford, C. D., & Goglia, J. J. (2010). Safety management
systems in aviation. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Vincoli, J. W. (2006). Basic guide to system safety (2nd Ed.). Hoboken,
NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
Volkmer, F. L. (2011). Revising the hazard report program with safety
management system perspective: Assessing Brazilian Air Force safety
specialists’ perceptions (Unpublished master’s thesis). University of
Central Missouri, Warrensburg, MO.
Walala, M. S. (2016). A cross-sectional and mixed-method assessment of
safety culture and safety climate at a regional airline (Unpublished
doctoral dissertation). Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN.
Wells, A. T., & Rodrigues, C. C. (2003). Commercial aviation safety.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Wells, A. T., & Wensveen, J. G. (2004). Air transportation: A mana-
gement perspective. Belmont, CA: Thomson Learning.
Wiegmann, D. A., Thaden, T. L. V., & Gibbons, M. A. (2007). A review of
safety culture theory and its potential application to traffic safety.
Retrieved from the Transportation Research Board on the National
Academies website: http://trid.trb.org/view.aspx?id5809716
Wood, R. H. (2003). Aviation safety programs: A management handbook.
Englewood, CO: Jeppesen Sanderson.
Wood, R. H., & Swegininis. (2006). Aircraft accident investigation.
Casper, WY: Endeavor Books.
Yin, R. K. (5th Ed). (2014). Case study research: Design and methods.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Appendix
Table 1
Characteristics of different safety cultures.
Safety Culture Characteristics
POOR BUREAUCRATIC HEALTHY
Hazard information is Suppressed Ignored Actively sought
Safety messages are Discouraged or punished Tolerated Trained and encouraged
Responsibility for safety is Avoided Allowed but discouraged Rewarded
Failures lead to Cover-ups Local fixes Inquiries and systemic reform
New ideas are Crushed Considered as new problems Really welcomed
Note. This table was adapted from the ‘‘ICAO Accident Prevention Programme,’’ by ICAO, 2005, Montreal, Canada: Author.
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Table 2
Components and elements of an SMS.
COMPONENTS ELEMENTS
Safety policy and objectives Management commitment and responsibility
Safety accountabilities
Appointment of key safety personnel
Coordination of emergency response planning
SMS documentation
Safety risk management Hazard identification
Assessment and mitigation
Safety assurance Safety performance monitoring and measurement
The management of change
Continuous improvement of the SMS
Safety promotion Training and education
Safety communication
Note 1. This table specifies the framework for the implementation and maintenance of an SMS. The framework comprises four components and twelve
elements as the minimum requirements for SMS implementation.
Note 2. This table was adapted from the ‘‘ICAO Annex 19,’’ by ICAO, 2013c, Montreal, Canada: Author.
Figure 3. The safety risk management process.
Note. This process was adapted from the ‘‘ICAO Safety Management Manual,’’ by ICAO, 2013b, Montreal, Canada: Author.
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Table 3
Existing processes and programs that could be integrated to the SMS in order to satisfy the FAA SMS requirements.
PROGRAM OBJECTIVE SMS INTEGRATION
Aviation Safety Action Program
(ASAP)a
ASAP is designed to encourage voluntary
reporting of safety issues and events that come to the
attention of participating certificate holders’ personnel




Allows aviation professionals to report to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
actual or potential discrepancies and deficiencies
involving the safety of aviation operations in the
interest of improving aviation safety
Trend and global systemic information may be
appropriate for safety assurance (SA)
Voluntary Disclosure Reporting
Program (VDRP)a
Provides incentives for a certificate holder to
voluntarily identify, report, and correct
instances of regulatory noncompliance
Data gathered during an investigation, subsequent
development, and implementation of a fix could
be integrated into the data analysis, assessment,
and validation processes of an approved flight
school’s SMS SA
Emergency response plan (ERP)b Provides for the orderly and efficient transition
from normal to emergency operations and the
return to normal operations
It may satisfy the safety policy ERP component of
an SMS
Quality management systems (QMS)b Provides consistency in the delivery of products and
services to meet performance standards as well as
customer expectations
SMS and QMS utilize similar risk management and
assurance processes (can be integrated in both
processes)
PART 141 requirementsc Prescribes the requisites for issuing pilot school
certificates, provisional pilot school certificates,
and associated ratings, and the general operating
rules applicable to a holder of a certificate or rating
issued under this part
Many requirements could be used to satisfy the
AC120-92B (e.g., Part 141 Subpart A 1 141.21
and Subpart F, and AC120-92B 1 5.23)
Note. a(FAA, 2015b), b(ICAO, 2013c), c(Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter H, Part 141, 2015)
Table 4
Benefits of SMS implementation.
ICAO FAA Ludwig et al.
Provides for the investigation of
accidents. Yet, it will lower the
consequence of events
Assists in making effective and informed safety
decisions




Promotes the active involvement
of the operational leaders
Improves employee morale and productivity
Reduces organizational risks and increases
profitability
Identifies risks in operations and reduces
them to an acceptable level
Establishes a marketable safety record
Promotes the integration of the different
organizations’ management systems
Ensures that safety information undergirds
the decision making process by all levels
of management
Ensures logical prioritization of safety needs
Ensures compliance with and, wherever
possible, exceeds legislative and regulatory
requirements and standards
Assists service providers in meeting regulatory
requirements
Assures compliance with legal responsibilities
for safety
Introduces supplementary performance-based
elements for more effective control of safety
risks
Reduces insurance and liability costs Provides more efficient maintenance
scheduling and resource utilization
Encourages and facilitates the implementation
of a positive safety culture
Promotes the development, implementation,
and, maintenance of a healthy safety culture
Spreads responsibility for safe operations
throughout all levels and segments of the
organization
Establishes and implements processes and
procedures that facilitate effective communication
throughout all levels of the organization
Maintains open lines of communication up
and down the organization and among peers
Promotes the continuous improvement of
operational processes
Ensures safety is a primary responsibility
of all managers
Ensures that personnel understand that safety
is an essential part of their job performance
Avoids incident investigation costs and
operational disruptions
Note 1. This table was adapted from the following: ‘‘ICAO Annex 19,’’ by ICAO, 2013a, Montreal, Canada: Author; ‘‘AC-120-92B,’’ by the FAA, 2015a;
and from the ‘‘Safety Management Systems for Airports,’’ by Ludwig et al., 2007, Transportation Research Board.
Note 2. Cardoso and colleagues (2008a) also suggest that an SMS can reduce the costs of aircraft accidents and incidents and related disruptions; improve
employee morale and productivity; improve the logical prioritization of safety needs; provide more efficient maintenance scheduling and resource
utilization; and promote the continuous improvement of operational processes.
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Figure 4. Integration of safety risk management and safety assurance.
Note 1. The SRM process provides for the identification of safety hazards and assessment of risk. Safety risk controls capable of bringing the risk to an
acceptable level are developed by using system safety tools, and then they are employed operationally. The safety assurance function takes over at this point
to ensure that the safety risk controls are being practiced and will continue to achieve their intended objectives. If this is not the case, the safety assurance
process needs to determine if the shortfall is because the controls are not being used as intended (e.g., required training not accomplished, lack of or poor
procedures, inadequate tools or equipment provided), or if, even though the system is being used as intended, it is not producing the expected results. In the
former case, action should be taken to correct the problem, corrective action(s). In the latter case, the system design should be reconsidered using the path
back to the SRM process (FAA, 2015b).
Note 2. This system also provides for assessment of the need for new controls because of changes in the operational environment.
Note 3. This Figure was adapted from the ‘‘Safety Management Systems in Aviation,’’ by A. J. Stolzer, C. D. Halford, and J. J. Goglia, 2010, Aldershot,
UK: Ashgate; and from AC120-92B, by the FAA, 2015b.
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